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Is Strict Privity
Here To Stay?
BY ANGELA MARIE VALLARIO
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nder Maryland case law, a plaintiff
in an estate planning malpractice action must be in strict privity with the
\ '
attorney who drafted the will. To
~"~
date, Maryland has not extended the
~~
third-party beneficiary exception to
the estate planning arena.
Legatees specifically identified in a will by name or
class are generally precluded from bringing a cause
of action against the attorney for the attorney's alleged
negligence, because in Maryland in order to recover
for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must show: "(1) the
attorney's employment; (2) his neglect of a reasonable
duty; and (3) loss to the client proximately caused
by that neglect of duty." See Noble v. Bruce, 349 Md.
730,739 (citing Flanherty v. Weinberg, 303 Md. 116, 128
(1985); see also Bradley Fogel, Attorney v. ClientPrivity, Malpractice, and the Lack of Respect for the
Primacy of the Attorney-Client Relationship in Estate
Planning, 68 Tenn. L. Rev. 261, 267 (2001).
Maryland is in the minority of states that still adhere to the strict privity rule in the context of estate
planning. Most other jurisdictions have relaxed the
privity barrier in order to allow a legitimately aggrieved beneficiary to have a means of recourse against
an attorney who planned the distribution of the decedent's estate in a negligent manner. Other jurisdictions following strict privity, have carved out the
third-party beneficiary exception in the estate-planning context where the attorney's negligence was "facially demonstrated" on the will itself. See Hamilton
v. Needham, 519 A.2d 172 (D.C. 1988).
In Maryland, a plaintiff in a malpractice action must
show that the attorney owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. Flaherty at 134. The duty of care is generally shown
by the presence of an attorney-client relationship between the plaintiff and the attorney. In the estate planning context, the attorney-client relationship is most
often established between a decedent and the attorney who prepared the will. Because identified will
beneficiaries are not generally part of the attorneyclient relationship, under Maryland case law they are
likely precluded from suing the attorney for malpractice. The attorney who drafts the will owes a duty
only to the decedent, who employed The attorney. Noble v. Bruce, 349 Md. 730,752-53 (1998).

Ms. Vallario is an Assistant Professor at the University
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The Court of Appeals has held that an attorney's
duty is limited to his client because only "[a]client who
has employed an attorney has a right to his diligence,
his knowledge, and his skill; and [if] he ... neglected
to employ them, the law properly makes him liable for
the loss which has accrued to his employer." Kendall v.
Rogers, 181 Md. 606,609 (1943) (citing Cochrane v. Little, 71 Md. 323 (1889»). Allowing only the person who
signed the will to sue the estate-planning attorney creates virtual immunity for those attorneys who make
mistakes, because any negligence that has occurred,
will most likely be discovered only after the death of
the client who signed the will. The testamentary beneficiaries are the persons most likely damaged by the
negligence, but they will be left without a remedy.
The personal representative of the decedent may
have standing to sue; yet there are limited occasions
upon which this cause of action will result in damages. Additionally if the negligence is discovered during the client's lifetime, the will can be amended without
harm to the client and with no real liability for the attorney. Such mitigation of damage to the client is all to
the good.
The cost to the attorney is the preparation of a codicil or new will without further compensation. There
is the possibility that the client will still be alive but incompetent, which will preclude correcting the mistake
by rewriting the will correctly. In that case a guardian
or an attorney-in-fact could sue the attorney for malpractice but damages would be limited to the attorney
fee paid. See Noble at 759.
The Court of Appeals has recognized the third-party beneficiary exception to the strict privity rule in contract cases. See Flaherty v. Weinberg, 303 Md. 116
(1985). In Flaherty, third parties, not in contractual privity with the negligent attorney, stated a cause of action
for negligent misrepresentation under a third-party
beneficiary contract theory. The Flahertys contracted
for the sale of a house and at the settlement, the attorney, Weinberg, assured them that the house they were
buying was the property as described in the survey. When a subsequent survey revealed that the property purchased by the Flahertys encroached the
neighboring property, the Flahertys brought suit against
the attorney, upon theories of negligence and breach
of warranty. Flaherty at 133.
In its reasoning, the court acknowledged that a prerequisite fbr maintaining an action in negligence against
an attorney is the existence of an employment rela-
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tionship, but that an express agreement
not necessary in all cases. The strict
privity rule in the estate planning context
was most recently addressed by the
Court of Appeals in Noble, where the
Court adhered to the strict privity rule
thus barring the action by the will beneficiaries because there was no "employment relationship" between the attorney
and the harmed beneficiaries.
The Noble Court refused to extend the
third-party beneficiary exception to the
testamentary beneficiaries because of the
lack of communication between the attorneyand the beneficiaries and the beneficiaries' lack of reliance on the
attorney. The Court noted that the testamentary beneficiaries are not per se intended beneficiaries. Noble at 753. The
Court of Appeals justified its decision on
public policy grounds aimed at protecting the attorney-client relationship. The
Court of Appeals found the strict privity rule protects: (1) the integrity and
solemnity of the will; (2) the attorneyclient relationship and (3) attorney-client
confidentiality. Id. at 756-758.
The Court of Appeals found the testamentary beneficiaries are not intended
beneficiaries unless "the client's intent to
benefit the nonclient [is] a direct purpose
of the transaction or relationship." Id. at
753-54. The Court further noted that in
cases involving wills, the beneficiary of
a will is not necessarily the beneficiary of
the attorney-client relationship. The
Court speculated that the testator's intent and purpose in executing a will may
not be to benefit the beneficiaries named
in the will, but rather to prevent the intestate distribution of assets. Id. at 754
(emphasis added).
Moreover, the testator's intent could
have been to exclude certain heirs or to
dictate personally the dispositive
scheme. Id. at 754. In reaching its decision, the Court considered essential ethical protections of the attorney-client
relationship and feared that if it did not
draw a clear line, there would be no limit on the number of people to whom an
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attorney would be obligated. Id. at_.
In Noble, the Court of Appeals of Maryland consolidated two separate malpractice actions brought by testamentary
beneficiaries against the attorney who
drafted the testator's will. In the first action, testamentary beneficiaries brought
a cause of action of professional malpractice against attorneys who failed to
incorporate a credit shelter trust, in the estate planning for Mr. and Mrs. Long. The
attorney prepared mirror wills leaving all
property to each other with a contingent
provision for the distribution of the estate
on the death of the survivor.
The contingent provisions called for
certain real property to pass outright to
one daughter; a partial interest in other
real property passed to Mr. Long's sister;
with the remainder passing subject to a
life estate in a son, to their children as joint
tenants with the right of survivorship.
Shortly after the death of Mr. Long, Mrs.
Long as the sole owner of all property received pursuant to the above-referenced
mirror will transferred all real property
to her sister and son. The remainder beneficiaries' complaint alleged that the at-'
torney was negligent in rendering poor
tax advice as estate taxes could have been
eliminated with the use of a credit shelter
trust which would have avoided the
bunching of assets in their mother's estate. Id. at 734.
In the second of the consolidated cases,
the attorney prepared Ms. Jackson's will,
which identified the Fauntleroys as the
residual beneficiaries. The will also contained a tax provision. The tax provision
caused $910,000 of taxes to be paid from
the residual estate. The Fauntleroys filed
suit against the attorney's estate (because
the attorney had died) alleging that he
negligently prepared the will which
caused all the taxes to be paid from the
residuary estate. The beneficiaries' position was based on the allegation that this
was contrary to the testatrix's intent. Id.
at 737.
In both instances, the alleged negligence
is questionable and justifies the Court's

adherence to the strict privity rule. With
respect to the Longs, the testamentary
beneficiaries allege that it was negligent
for the attorney not to incorporate a
credit shelter trust in the Longs' wills.
The beneficiaries argued but for the negligence, the entire estate would have
passed free of federal estate tax. Although most clients desire to minimize
federal estate taxes in planning, there are
a number of non-tax objectives that simply cannot be achieved with a credit shelter trust.
For example, in this case, Mrs. Long
after the death of her husband would not
have been able to transfer the real property if the parties had employed a credit shelter trust in Mr. Long's will. The
very property Mrs. Long transferred
would have been trust property held by
the trustee which would have precluded Mrs. Long from singlehandedly transferring the property to her sister and son.
Furthermore, the attorney testified that
credit shelter trusts were expressly rejected by the Longs because the survivor
wanted control of the assets during his
or her lifetime. Additionally, after Mr.
Long's death, Mrs. Long could have disclaimed property she inherited from Mr.
Long to accomplish the tax savings that
were forgone by the will that did not incorporate the credit shelter trust, but she
did not. As to the Fauntleroys, the residual beneficiaries claimed that the attorney was negligent in avoiding the tax
apportionment statute of Md. Tax Gen.
§7-308 by including a tax clause having
all taxes paid from the residuary estate.
The case for negligence is weak because there are several reasons for the
incorporation of a tax clause. With the
facts in the Fauntleroy case, the Court
was not willing to speculate as to the testamentary intent. In Noble, the Court rejected a change in Maryland law with
respect to the strict privity rule in the estate-planning context. In reaching its decision, the Court agreed with the Court
of Special Appeals' result, but not "all of
its reasoning," in Kirgan v.Parks, 60 Md.
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App. 1, cert. denied, 301 Md. 639 (1984);
Noble at 754.
In Kirgan, the court held that a testamentary beneficiary has no cause of action against the lawyer for alleged
negligence in drafting the will when: (1)
the will is valid; (2) the intent expressed
in the will has been carried out; and (3)
there was no concession of error by the
attorney. rd. at 12-13. Thus because the
Noble facts did not support a Kirgan
cause of action, the Court applied the
strict privity rule which prevented the
testamentary beneficiaries from suing the
attorney for legal malpractice. What remains unclear is whether the Court
would carve out a third-party beneficiary
exception where the beneficiary has
demonstrated an obvious lack of care and
skill on the part of the attorney. See
Hamilton.
In a District of Columbia case, the testatrix's attorney failed to include a residuary clause in her will that resulted in a
testamentary beneficiary being deprived
of nearly $60,000. While Hamilton's firm
admitted the omission was negligent, the
trial court denied recovery to Needham
due to lack of privity. The Appellate
Court reversed, holding that the testamentary beneficiary could maintain a
malpractice action against the drafting
attorneys despite lack of privity. Hamilton v. Needham, 459 A.2d 1060 (D.c. 1983).
Upon remand, Needham was
awarded the money lost due to the negligent drafting. Hamilton appealed.
Hamilton raised several issues on appeal.
His first contention was that the trial court
failed to require expert testimony on the
attorney's standard of care. Hamilton,
519 A.2d at 173. The court answered by
noting that no complex issue was raised
that required expert testimony and further stated that "a lawyer who admits
that he omitted from a will a residuary
clause requested by the testator and
thereby causes the residual estate to pass
by intestate succession has facially
demonstrated an obvious lack of care and
skill." rd. at 175.
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Hamilton's next argument was that
the testatrix had a duty to observe the
omission, and her failure to do so should
relieve him of liability. Id. The court dismissed his assertion by recognizing that
the testatrix had a right to rely on Hamilton due to the fiduciary nature of their
relationship. rd. Finally, Hamilton argued
that the trial court erred in allowing extrinsic evidence to be admitted to show
the testatrix's true intent. The court rejected this argument stating that without the admission of extrinsic evidence,
the malpractice claim would be unprovable, thus leaving Needham without remedy. In a footnote, the court
refused to adopt the rationale that extrinsic evidence may only be admitted
to show that the testatrix's intent was
frustrated. rd. at 175, n. 7.
. Specifically, the court noted that "[the
testatrix's will was] silent as to the disposition of her residuary estate. Therefore, a finding that she intended that it
pass to Needham is in no way contradictory to, nor does it frustrate, the language of the will itself. Indeed the
absence of any residuary clause customary in a professionally drawn will
coupled with a provision that any inheritance taxes due be a charge against
'my residuary estate' provide internal
evidence within the will itself that something may be awry." rd.
Consider the following hypothetical:An elderly widow visits a Maryland
attorney to prepare a will for a $150
fee. The widow's blood relatives include
an adult son and his daughter. The widow desires her twenty-five year old
granddaughter to receive her house,
bank account, and automobile. The widow's only son does not inherit under the
will. The attorney drafts her will, which
specifically devises her home to her
granddaughter; bequeaths the cash in a
SUNlRUST Bank and the automobile to
the named granddaughter.
The will does not provide for a contingent beneficiary nor does the will include a residuary clause. Years pass and

the widow decides to sell her home and
relocates to an assisted living community. The $150,000 cash from the sale of
the home is invested in stock with Legg
Mason. Her eyesight begins to fail and
she is no longer able to drive so she sells
her automobile and deposits the proceeds in her investment account with
Legg Mason. Finally, she consolidates
her assets by having her cash in SUNTRUST bank moved to a Legg Mason
money market account. Several years
go by and she dies.
Upon her death, the above referenced
will devises and bequeaths assets that
are no longer part of her probate estate. Although the will is valid in that it
satisfies the statutory formalities of Md.
Code Ann. Est. & Trusts §§4-101; 4-102,
it fails to dispose of property owned by
the testatrix. Because the specifically devised and bequeathed properties are no
longer in existence, the properties adeem
and the granddaughter receives nothing. Since the testatrix's Legg Mason account was not disposed of by her valid
will, the rules of intestate succession control its disposition. The son as her sole
heir receives the widow's entire estate
pursuant to Md. Code Ann. Est. & Trusts
§3-103.
The attorney documents that there
was a discussion of a residuary clause
between him and his client, which was
rejected. Her preference was to iteniize
her assets and dispose of them as done
by the will prepared. The question that
arises is whether the granddaughter can
bring a malpractice action against the attorney for failing to include a residuary
provision, which provided for her.lf the
failure to include a residuary clause in
any will constitutes malpractice (See 7
Am. Jur.2d Attorneys at Law §§212-253;
J.A. Bock, Annotation, Liability of One
Drawing an Invalid Will, 65 A.L.R.2d
1363 (1959» then does the granddaughter have standing to sue? If the testamentary beneficiary has standing to sue
would her recovery be limited to the
$150 fee?
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One could argue that under Kirgan
"the intent expressed in the will" has
not been carried out and thus the granddaughter has a malpractice action
against the attorney for malpractice. Kirgan at 12-13 (text item 2). Yet the Maryland Courts have stated that "where the
language of a will is plain and unambiguous, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to show that the testator's
intention was different from that which
the will discloses, because evidence intended to alter the language of the will
would violate the statute." Noble at 749.
Moreover, "extrinsic evidence is not
admissible to show that the testator's
intent was different from that expressed
in the will. Attorney malpractice cases
involving nonclients and arising out of
will drafting or estate planning require
special considerations because the testator is dead. If extrinsic evidence were
admitted, the potential for fraud and
the risk of misinterpreting the testator's
intent increases dramatically." Noble at
754 (citing Espinosa v. Sparber, Shevin,
Shapo, Rosen and Heilbronner, 612 So.2d
1378 (Fla. 1993».
In light of the rules of evidence necessary to protect the solemnity of a will
the hypothetical facts do not support a
Kirgan cause of action by the granddaughter. Kirgan allows a testamentary
beneficiary to sue the attorney in legal
malpractice if there is a concession of error by the attorney. Kirgan at 12-13 (text
item 3).
Because the hypothetical attorney
does not admit any negligence, the testamentary beneficiary cannot sue the
attorney. In the estate-planning setting
where there is an unambiguous valid
will, as long as the attorney's conduct
does not escalate to the level of fraud or
collusion, if there is no acknowledgment
of negligence on the part of the attorney, the testamentary beneficiary does
not have standing to sue in Maryland.
See Noble at 738 (citing National Savings
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Bank v. Ward, 100 U.s. 195, 205-206
obvious lack of care and skill with no
(1879».
plausible explanation for the alleged negA distinction can be made between the
ligence would not open the floodgates of
hypothetical facts and the Noble case,
litigation. There would be a clear limitation concerning the persons to whom the
however, which warrants deviation from
the strict privity rule. In Noble there were
attorney would be obligated, and under
what circumstances the obligation would
plausible explanations for the estate planarise. If the courts overcome strict privity
ning performed by the attorneys. In light
in situation where the document facialof the possible reasons for the documents
ly demonstrates an obvious lack of care
to be in their current form, the court was
and skill, the issue of damages arises. Dicunwilling to speculate as to the testata in Noble suggests that if a cause of acmentary intent without the ability to contion were allowed by the testamentary
fer with the decedents. If the facts of the
hypothetical case provide no reasonable
beneficiaries that the damages would be
justification for the attorney's failure to
limited to the attorney fee. Noble at 759.
include a residuary provision in a will,
In effect that would mean no real recovery at all. If the Court extends the
then the failure to include a residuary
provision in a will constitutes negligence
third-party beneficiary exception to testamentary beneficiaries where there is
for which a legal malpractice action
an obvious lack of care and skill, the
should be brought.
Because the possible negligence was
Court should entitle the harmed benediscovered upon the death of the testaficiaries to their actual damages. Current
trix, the law should provide protection
Maryland law suggests that no matter
how heinous conduct of a estate-planfor the testamentary beneficiary who was
harmed by the negligence and will otherning attorney, the strict privity rule
wise be left without a remedy. In Hamilshields the attorney. The testamentary
ton, the court stated "a lawyer who
beneficiaries may be able to file a grievadmits that he omitted from a will a . ancecomplaintagainsttheattomey.Such
residuary clause required by the testator
a complaint will not compensate the benand thereby causes the residual estate to
eficiaries, so there is no real remedy for
pass by intestate succession has facially
the harm caused.
demonstrated an obvious lack of care
Perhaps the attorney's conduct in Noand skill." Hamilton at 175.
ble did not rise to the level of egregiousMoreover, the absence of any residness necessary to overcome the strict
uary clause customary in a professionprivity rule in Maryland. At some point,
ally drawn will coupled with a tax
it is hoped the courts will draw the line
provision provide "internal evidence
to lift the strict privity rule barrier to rewithin the will itself that something may
lief for a testamentary beneficiary who
be awry" Id. at_.
falls victim to the gross negligence of the
The hypothetical facts are distindrafting attorney. Although the Court of
guishable also from Hamilton in two
Appeals has not yet carved out the thirdways. First there was no admission by
party beneficiary exception needed to althe attorney and secondly there was no
low testamentary beneficiaries to sue the
attorney, it is unlikely that the Court will
tax provision. These distinctions might
not result in a different outcome.
continue to allow the strict privity barrier to shelter gross negligence, particularly
when the estate planning document facially demonstrates an obvious lack of
Extending the third-party beneficiary
exception to a situation where there is an
care and skill.
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